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Abstract: To explore strategic aspects of corporate social responsibility (CSR), this paper
examines the impact of CSR activities on corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing
from and synthezing two literatures, the well-known instrumental/strategic stakeholder
theory and research on CSR strategic value criteria (Burke and Logsden, 1996), we
conceptualize appropriability as a variable intermediating between a firm’s CSR activities
and its CSP. We suggest that two considerations shape appropriability in the context of
corporate social performance: 1) the extent to which social actions go beyond legal
requirements and dominant social norms (voluntarism and proactivity) and, 2) the
coherence of stakeholder groups’ interest aggregation and articulation. We hypothesize a
clear positive connection between investment in corporate social activities and CSP
where appropriability is high. Our second conceptual contribution is to categorize CSR
activities as performance-oriented and learning/information acquisition-oriented. Where
appropriability is low, we expect activities will be learning/information acquisitionoriented and the association between corporate social activity and CSP negative. In
preliminary statistical tests we find empirical support for the value of developing the
appropriability concept in research on corporate social activity and corporate social
performance and further exploring the differences between performance-oriented and
learning-oriented corporate social activities.
Keywords: strategic corporate social responsibility, corporate social performance,
corporate social activity, appropriability, instrumental stakeholder theory

In the annual budget and program planning process for Microsoft’s corporate citizenship
a country manager proposed including a free condom with every Microsoft software CD
sold. After a global review, that proposal was cut from MS citizenship programming. At
the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Exxon’s corporate social responsibility focused
almost exclusively on charitable giving. In their corporate post-mortem, Exxon
emphasized how one of their key competitors, Arco (later merged with BP) included
extensive collaboration with environmental defense groups in its citizenship efforts. In
the face of rising controversy, AT&T debated its support for Planned Parenthood
International. Each of these examples reflects the gradual shift in corporate practice from
traditional philanthropy toward strategic CSR (Porter & Kramer, 2006)
From the academic perspective, efforts to evaluate the strategic value of corporate
social responsibility activities encompass 30 years of scholarship developing instrumental
stakeholder theory and testing the relationship between corporate social performance
(CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky
et.al., 2003) This literature includes important efforts to disaggregate, contextualize and
generally better specify how, why and when there might be a financial return to corporate
social responsibility activity (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Barnett, 2007; Siegel &
Vitaliano, 2007). Yet relatively little CSR scholarship focuses on the particular link, in
the complex causal chain connecting CSR to financial performance, between investment
in corporate social activities and corporate social performance. Barnett (2007, pp. 797)
notes that the connection between CSR resource allocation and corporate social
performance is “often unexplained and untested”.
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Strategic CSR (Baron, 2001; Husted & de Jesus Salazar, 2006) typically involves
assessing investment in corporate social responsibility activities for their impact on
financial performance. But as the CSR function becomes more and more professional,
strategic decision-making, defined as making disciplined choices about resource
allocation, also applies to impact on corporate social performance (CSP). This exercise
requires clearly defining CSP.
CSP is a problematic and controversial concept (Rowley and Berman, 2000;
Liston-Hayes & Ceton, 2008; Chaterjee et. al., 2007) but academic assessments identify
its value and suggest improvements (Caroll, 2000; Griffin, 2000) while the growing
number of large business services enterprises engaged in CSP measurement and reporting
(Thompson-Reuters, Bloomberg) testify to its value for practitioners. CSP is the profile
of business’s social face. Acts of corporate social responsibility are “investments that,
over time, aggregate into certain CSP postures” (Barnett, 2007). Corporate social activity
refers to voluntary corporate actions designed to improve social conditions, that firms
undertake to build a CSP posture (Mackey et al., 2007), or as corporate actions or
programs not required by law that attempt to increase social benefits or resolve social
problems involving stakeholders (constituencies) beyond the explicit transactional
interests of the firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000).
Any given firm can engage in a vast array of different social activities. These In
practicing strategic CSR, firms must choose between dedicating time and money to
particular activities/programs with impact on particular stakeholder groups, such as
convincing product development teams to consider a particular “green feature” or
expanding an employee volunteer program or joining other industry participants in an
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effort to build an industry-wide protocol for responsibility in a particular social issue
arena. Practicing strategic CSR implies that firms make choices about how to allocate a
firm’s resources across an array of possible social activities. But how do firms choose?
Two strands of literature help frame our investigation of this question.
Instrumental/strategic stakeholder theory emphasizes stakeholder prioritization as the key
to strategically leveraging corporate social activity. Mitchell et. al.’s (1997) framework
for categorizing stakeholders dominates existing research (Parent & Deephouse, 2007).
Another strand of literature on strategic CSR identifies a variety of criteria for predicting
the value of corporate social activities: centrality, visibility, proactivity,
specificity/appropriability, and voluntarism (Burke & Logsdon, 1996; Husted & Allen,
2007; Husted & Allen, 2009; Gyves & O’Higgins, 2008). In both cases strategic value is
usually defined in terms of financial rather than social performance. We synthesize and
extrapolate from these two literatures to illuminate the connection between investment in
corporate social activity and corporate social performance. The concept of appropriability
helps us connect and combine aspects of these two approaches to strategic CSR.

STAKEHOLDER CHARACTERISTICS AND THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL ACTIVITY ON CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE

Instrumental Stakeholder Theory
Donaldson and Preston (1995) delineated between three stakeholder theories:
normative stakeholder theory which proscribes what managers should do from an ethical
standpoint, descriptive stakeholder theory which describes and sometimes explains what
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managers actually do, and instrumental (strategic) stakeholder theory which explores the
financial consequences of how managers’ act towards stakeholders. Instrumental
stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995) suggests that managers’ views about stakeholders
should mediate the relationship between investment in corporate responsibility activities
and specific arenas of corporate social performance. For example, Brammer and Pavelin
(2006) show that the impact of corporate social activities on firm reputation is a function
of how well the firm achieves strategic alignment between the type of corporate social
responsibility activity and the firm’s stakeholder environment. Hillman and Keim (2001)
present evidence that corporate social responsibility activity directed to primary
stakeholders creates value for shareholders while other social activity does not. Johnson
and Greening (1999) find that accounting performance should be related to CSR activities
in “people” dimensions such as community, diversity and employee benefits, but not to
CSR activities in “product quality” dimensions. In short, instrumental stakeholder theory
directs attention to the alignment of corporate social responsibility activity and
‘strategically important’ stakeholders (Wood & Jones, 1995; Griffin & Mahon, 1997;
Orlitzky et. al., 2003).
“Strategic use of CSR,” requires firms assess “which sub-dimensions of social
performance” are most important for its stakeholders. (Akpinar et. al., 2008); Ruf et. al.,
2001; Wood & Jones, 1995). Thus, how managers’ prioritize among different
stakeholders, and the issues important to those stakeholders, is critical for the
development and empirical operationalization of instrumental stakeholder theory. Based
on the resource dependency paradigm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) instrumental
stakeholder theory indicates that financial performance is best if managers respond
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mostly to ‘strong’ stakeholders, those commanding resources upon which the firm
depends, and possessing the motivation and ability to withhold those resources if
necessary. This approach to instrumental stakeholder theory centers on stakeholder
importance defined as salience.
In this view, part of making CSR strategic is choosing between alternative
investments in social activity based on social performance targets in issue arenas crucial
to the firms’ most salient stakeholders. From a stakeholder prioritization perspective,
strategic CSR involves decisions to “earn” corporate social performance by investing in
particular corporate social activities based on the importance, defined as salience, of
different stakeholder groups.
Salience is usually conceptualized as the potential influence of the stakeholder
group on the firm seen through the eyes of corporate leaders. Salient stakeholders are
those who “posses the ability to impact the reputation and operations of the firm” (Peloza
& Panaia, 2008). Salience rests on the power, urgency and legitimacy of the stakeholder
group. (Mitchell et. al, 1997; Agle & Wood 1997; Magness, 2007; Gago & Antolin,
2004). Mitchell and colleagues (1997) suggest seven categories of stakeholders based on
different combinations of these three criteria. Despite the general dominance of the
Mitchell et. al. (1997) framework, there is relatively little agreement on which
stakeholder group criteria best help describe managers’ prioritization. Gago and Antolin
(2004) treat salience as a separate criteria rather than a summation of power, urgency and
legitimacy. Parent and Deephouse (2007) conduct a qualitative empirical study and
conclude that power and legitimacy are more important than salience. Another effort to
more carefully delineate stakeholder attributes includes dividing power into utilitarian,
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normative and coercive power (Ryan & Schneider, 2003). Mattingly (2004) argues that
urgency precedes power and legitimacy – in other words, urgency makes stakeholders
more legitimate and powerful.
As Cennamo et. al. note (2008, p. 493), “a fundamental problem in SM
[stakeholder management theory] is how to define and identify relevant stakeholders.”
Furthermore, there is growing acknowledgement that stakeholder groups’ issue
preferences are not stable and that stakeholder importance probably varies, not just across
industries, but over time (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Shropshire & Hillman, 2007;
Parent & Deephouse, 2007; Magness, 2007) and across firms within similar industries
(Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). Building on work on CSR strategic value criteria (Burke
& Logsdon, 1996), we develop an approach to conceptualization of stakeholder and
stakeholder issue importance to the firm based on the concept of appropriability.

Strategic CSR Value Criteria: Appropriability and Stakeholder Salience
Schumpeter (1950) introduced the concept and logic of appropriability to the field
of business and management. He posited a tension between innovation and competition
due to the challenge of competitors imitating and therefore undermining the gains from
any individual firms’ innovation efforts (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Economists (Arrow,
1962; Levin & Klevorick, 1987) and students of business strategy (Teece, 1986) went on
to explore and further refine the parameters and logic of this posited trade-off between
innovation and competition. The appropriability regime (Teece, 1986) determines the
likelihood that a firm can appropriate returns to expenditure/resource allocation
innovation requires. What are the critical aspects of an appropriability regime? Scholars
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have taken two different paths: one focused on ways to obstruct imitation (protection)
and one on capabilities for leveraging innovation including marketing and propensity for
learning. The approach focused on protection examines intellectual property law and its
enforcement, and contracting practices and possibilities – especially in the area of
employment law (non-compete clauses, for example). Through varied mechanisms the
appropriability regime creates incentives or disincentives for innovation that vary across
industries and firms.
A first-order extension of the appropriability regime concept to corporate social
responsibility activity would be to focus on the second of these two paths to
understanding apropriability: tacit or explicit knowledge and knowledge management
creation (Midttun, 2007; Bartlett, 2009). This CSR-as-innovation framing suggests new
research possibilities relating firms’ investment in CSR to corporate social performance
and corporate financial performance (Vilanova et. al., 2009; McManus, 2008; Hull and
Rothenberg, 2008). To integrate and build on the stakeholder salience aspect of
instrumental stakeholder theory and strategic CSR value criteria research, we take a
slightly different approach. We hypothesize about the nexus of appropriability and
stakeholder characteristics.
Burke and Logsden (1996) identify five strategic dimensions of CSR that impact
its value creation. These are: centrality, visibility, proactivity, specificity/appropriability
and voluntarism. These criteria predict the impact of corporate social activities on value
defined as financial performance. But how might these criteria also apply to the
prioritization of stakeholders in the search for improved corporate social performance?
In the economics and management literature appropriability refers to capturing

7

financial returns following the standard measure of strategic success as above average
profitability. This is also how the criteria of specificity/appropriability is defined in the
strategic CSR literature. In seeking to understand the impact of corporate social activity
on social performance the concept of appropriability is different. In the case of corporate
social performance, it refers to the firm’s ability to ascribe improvement in corporate
social performance to the corporation’s social activities. This conceptualization of
appropriability only makes sense in the more nuanced research agenda of contemporary
corporate sustainability/social impact management scholarship where corporate social
activity is clearly distinguished from corporate social performance.
In this conceptualization, appropriability stems to a large extent from proactivity
that will overlap extensively with voluntarism. The possibility to improve corporate
social performance with corporate social activities comes from being able to show the
corporation is going beyond compliance (voluntarism). From the perspective of
competitive advantage, anticipating emerging social issues (proactivity) is also critical for
achieving above-average corporate social performance through first-mover advantages.
Combining voluntarism and proactivity amounts to a firm strategy of addressing social
issues not covered by law or dominant social norms because the firm can appropriate
“credit” in stakeholders’ eyes, measured as improved corporate social performance.
Where law evolves in response to social norms, as in a common law system, the criteria
of proactivity is tightly linked to voluntarism.
In summary, the first element of our reconceptualization of appropriability is that
it encompasses two of the other criteria used in strategic CSR value criteria literature:
proactivity and voluntarism because it is defined as the extent to which activities are
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concerned with stakeholders/issues that are beyond the law and dominant social norms.
A fourth criteria laid out in the strategic CSR value criteria literature is visibility
which considers observability of corporate social activities by stakeholders. Visibility is a
communications function that comprises both outbound (corporation to stakeholder) and
inbound (stakeholder from corporation) components. The inbound portion of the
communication dynamic involved in unpacking the visibility criteria offers an additional
opportunity to synthesize instrumental/strategic stakeholder theory and strategic CSR
literature. This opportunity centers on the question of what shapes the ability of
stakeholder groups to hear and value corporate communication about corporate social
activity.
Building on the literature debating the distinctions between stakeholders that need
human proxies and those that do not (Driscoll & Starik, 2004; Phillips, 1997; Phillips &
Reichart, 2000; Starik, 1995) and between technical versus people (Mitroff, 1983) or
institutional stakeholders (Miles, 1987; Mattingly & Berman, 2004), we suggest that the
role of visibility is critically related to political characteristics of the stakeholder group –
does the group aggregate interests and can it articulate to the group and to outsiders the
aggregated (consensus) stand on issues?
Political science identifies how groups’ interests influence government action and
assigns an important intermediating role to political parties. Political parties serve two
main purposes in the translation of group interests into government actions: interest
aggregation and interest articulation (Almond et. al., 2007). Interest aggregation refers to
bringing together viewpoints around a more or less broadly shared group stance on a
particular issue or issue set. Interest articulation is defining and expressing, in other
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words, communicating a groups’ interests in a way that in-group members and other
groups can understand. Visibility as a criteria for choosing between different corporate
social activities hinges on how well stakeholder groups are organized for the purposes of
aggregating and articulating their interests. The visibility of corporate social activities
will only impact social performance to the extent that those who care about performance
in a particular social arena have effectively aggregated and articulated their interests.
Interest aggregation and articulation determines whether you “hear the tree falling in the
forest.” It helps determine the visibility of corporate social actions and their impact.
Davis and Thompson (1994, p. 160) apply this logic in their study of shareholder
activism and corporate governance. Critical in their results is the advantage institutional
investors derive from their organizational and interest cohesion.
The strategic CSR value criteria literature defines appropriability as: “the firm’s
ability to capture or internalize the benefits of a CSR program, rather than simply
creating collective goods which can be shared by others in the industry, community or
society at large" (Burke and Logsdon 1996, p. 497). In a careful analysis of the complex
interaction of appropriability, legal protection, spillovers and first mover advantage
Kopel (2009) ties the concept to specificity and legal protection for the fruits of
innovation. In this view the firm is appropriating value defined, by either the “five
forces” or “resource based view” of corporate strategy, as above-average profits. In other
words, the firm’s incentive to invest in corporate social activity is its potential to generate
financial returns. Following the call (Barnett, 2007) to focus on the links between
corporate social activity and corporate social performance, we draw on both instrumental
stakeholder theory and strategic corporate social responsibility values literature to
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redefine appropriability in the context of corporate social performance. In this context,
two considerations shape appropriability: 1) the scope for demonstrating commitment
beyond legal requirements and dominant social norms (proactivity and voluntarism) and,
2) the coherence of stakeholder groups’ interest aggregation and articulation.
Applying this conceptualization of appropriability offers insight into strategic
choice-making about corporate social responsibility activities. Expectations about
appropriability will guide firms strategic CSR practice toward investment in corporate
social responsibility activities where appropriability is high.

H1: Where appropriability is high, corporate social activity will have a positive impact
corporate social performance.

PERFORMANCE VERSUS LEARNING ORIENTED CORPORATE SOCIAL
ACTIVITIES
Beyond which stakeholders and stakeholder issues are targeted, scholars have
categorized different corporate social activities according to various criteria: how much
social responsiveness the activity reflects (Carroll 1979), the extent of dialogue versus
unilateral action involved in the activity (Mattingly 2004; Freeman 1994), the
“restriction” or “exchange” orientation of the stakeholder engagement the activity
involves (Tokoro, 2007), whether it is philanthropic, integrative or innovative (Kourula &
Holmes, 2008) or whether it is “market” or “non-market” focused (Lankoski, 2008).
Considering the question of how, when and why corporate social activities impact
corporate social performance another issue is critical: is all social activity oriented toward
relatively short-term achievement measured as social performance “output”? The
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“boundary-spanning” aspect of corporate social activity helps fuel continuous corporate
adaptation for social benefit. In this case the time frame and mind-set may be longer term
while still involving strategic choice-making. Boundary spanning occurs through
stakeholder engagement in forms ranging from ad hoc meetings of CSR board
committees with particular stakeholder groups (Post et. al., 2002; Sloan, 2009) to
negotiated and formally-contracted corporate-non-profit partnerships (Holmes & Moir,
2007). Scholars identify slightly different causal stories linking these corporate social
activities to innovation and learning. One is that it allows the corporation to sense future
trends (Senge, 2004; Bindu & Salk, 2006; Hanke & Stark, 2009) that may help set the
corporate citizenship agenda by identifying emerging issues and spurring evolution of
corporate social responsibility practice. A second causal story is that these corporate
social activities seed ideas for new products and markets (Kantor, 1999; Hart &
Christiansen, 2002; Sharma, 2006; Louche et. al., 2010; Holmes & Smart, 2009). Another
approach is to focus on the impact of corporate social activity on management systems
emphasizing that engaging in corporate social activities brings a firm closer to a “learning
organization” (Gond & Herrbach, 2006; Zwetsloot, 2003).
Gond and Herrbach (2006) see social accounting, broadly defined, as a learning
tool. Building on this approach we hypothesize that some social activities will be more
closely tied to short-term performance improvements (Jones & Murrell, 2001) and others
more tightly associated with learning/information acquisition as part of a process of
longer-term change. Considering the conceptualization of appropriability expectations as
intermediating the nexus of corporate social activity and corporate social performance,
the short-term performance improvement orientation for corporate social activity may be
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more likely when appropriability is high. When appropriability is low, corporate social
activities will likely be more learning-oriented. The relationship between corporate social
responsibility activities and CSP in this case may be more circular than in the case of
short-term performance improvement oriented social activities. Poor performance may
spur increased learning-oriented activity.

H2 Where appropriability is low, corporate social activities will be learning oriented and
negatively associated with corporate social performance.
RESEARCH METHODS

Concepts and indicators
Independent Variables – Corporate Corporate Social Activities.
Identifying measureable indicators that capture the extent or nature of corporate
social activity on a consistent, reliable basis across many different firms is problematic.
There is a cottage industry of CSR performance consultants each with a different
methodology for cost benefit analysis. Existing empirical studies of CSR activity by
scholars tend to measure the level of investment using charitable giving, even when the
conceptualization of CSR activity/programming is much broader than philanthropy
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Adams and Hardwick, 1998). Marquis, Glynn and Davis
(2007) suggest disaggregating philanthropy by using KLD’s threshold level data. KLD
gives points to firms passing level thresholds on six different criteria which disaggregate
philanthropic donations into: charitable giving, innovative giving, support for housing,
support for education, non-US charitable giving and “other strength” (such as volunteer
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programs of in-kind donations.) Other scholars have operationalized the level of social
responsiveness, the RADP scale (Clarkson, 1995; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). Because
we are interested in both the totality and diversity of corporate social activities in order to
explore their impact on corporate social performance philanthropy is too narrow an
indicator and the RADP scale is resource-intensive.
We use four indicators of corporate social activity: publication of a CSR report,
authenticated GRI reporting, existence of a board committee charged with social
responsibility/sustainability and use of third party auditors to review social
responsibility/sustainability. Our use of several disclosure activities as a proxy for social
activity in general follows other empirical studies that explicitly seek to measure the
association of disclosure and performance (Clarkson et. al., 2008; Prado-Lorenzo et. al.,
2009; Roberts, 1992; Vurro & Perrini, 2009).
We categorize CSR and GRI reporting as performance-oriented types of social
activities. CSR reporting is increasingly prevalent in the US although it lags corporate
practice in Europe. GRI reporting is less prevalent because to be considered a GRI
reporter a company must report on at least one criterion in each of the GRI’s six
standards areas.
We categorize CSR committee and external audit as proxies for learning-oriented
corporate social activities. These are partially “outsourced” or externalized corporate
social activity management that can help the firm gain new understanding of stakeholders
and their issues.
Dependent Variable – Corporate Social Performance for Stakeholders. Scholars
interested in the role of appropriability in shaping the value of corporate social activity
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note its complexity and attendant measurement difficulties (Kopel 2009). We have
conceptualized appropriability as a criteria related to stakeholders and the issues they
champion. The appropriability associated with stakeholder groups’ and their issues are
the function of two criteria: the extent of voluntarism and proactivity, which we argue
covaries, and the extent of interest aggregation and articulation coherence.
Based on the CSR literature and several CSR standards, we identify six common
stakeholder groups: consumers, employees, diversity constituencies, human rights
constituencies, environmental constituencies and community members. We consider the
appropriability that firms can anticipate with regard to these groups and their issues in the
US context. We note that both aspects of appropriabiity in our conceptualization are
highly sensitive to geographic cultural context. Our assumptions for the US are evident in
Figure 1 and explained below.

Figure 1 about here

As a general stakeholder category, communities typically have issues that are
guided by dominant social norms and they tend not to have mechanisms to consistently
aggregate/synthesize interests. Support for open park land is not likely a cutting edge
issue but at the same time community organization to support taking land off the
residential or commercial tax rolls is not likely to draw consistent, coherent support
because of the trade-off between green space and tax revenue that might support other
community needs. This combination of low opportunity for voluntarism and proactivity
and poor interest coherence gives community stakeholders and their issues relatively low
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appropriability. At the opposite extreme are environmental stakeholders who tend to
champion issues that are often only weakly protected by law/dominant social norms.
They also tend to be well organized by interest associations that facilitate interest
aggregation and articulation. This combination of high opportunity for proactivity and
voluntarism plus high interest coherence and articulation puts the environmental
stakeholders and their issues at the high end of the appropriability continuum.
The interests of employees and consumers in the US are relatively well covered
by laws about competition, safety, and standards, but as groups they tend to have interest
associations or other vehicles that facilitate interest aggregation and articulation. Labor
unions serve this purpose for employees. Public defenders in the US are often good
vehicles for aggregating and articulating consumer interests in class action suits. This
combination of low opportunity for voluntarism and proactivity yet higher interest
aggregating and articulation put these stakeholders in an intermediate position on the
appropriability continuum. Also in an intermediate position are human rights and
diversity stakeholders whose issues afford opportunity to be out ahead of law and social
norms but who do not consistently have the organizational coherence of some other
stakeholder groups.

Data and Sample
In order to test our hypotheses, we assembled multiple data sources into a dataset
of companies which are publicly held in the U.S. and internationally well known. Our
initial dataset consists of companies selected in the Fortune Global 500 in 2007. We
chose the Fortune Global 500 because these are large companies which would typically
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consider CSR activities directed toward a variety of stakeholders. Since 2005 Fortune
magazine has announced a ranking of the top 500 public corporations all over the world
as measured by gross revenue.
Next, we collected data indicating the types of CSR activities. We examined each
company’s website and reports to see if the company had a CSR committee, issued a
CSR report, issued a GRI report, and used professional auditors to assess CSP.
Finally, we compiled corporate social performance data using KLD social data. In
order to test the temporal impacts of CSR activities on CSP, we compile KLD data for
both 2007 and 2008. It only covers U.S. companies. Thus, merging the Global Fortune
500 and the KLD datasets yields 162 U.S. companies.
For the other variables we obtained financial data from the Standard & Poor’s
CompuStat and the Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP). Merging these data
sets from several different datasets including Fortune Global 500 List, KLD social data,
CompuStat, CRSP and company websites impacts our sample size. The final sample size
in our statistical analysis models is 88 and 84 for large U.S. companies in 2007 and 2008
respectively.

Measurements
We use six different dependent variables and four independent variables in order
to test the proposed hypotheses. The six dependent variables cover six stakeholder
groups: consumers, employees, human rights advocates, diversity advocates, the
environment and community. Each variable is a measure of corporate social performance
in issue areas of concern to a particular stakeholder group. We call this measure “CSP for
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Stakeholders”. For four independent variables we use the following programs as proxies
for CSR activities: ‘CSR reporting’, ‘GRI report’, ‘CSR committee’, and ‘Professional
audit’. In addition, we create other variables to control each company’s size, asset and
intangible resources.
Independent Variables – CSR Activities. We compiled data for each of these four
variables for all 500 companies on the Global Fortune 500 list for 2007 from company
websites and external relations offices. We scored each variable as “0” or “1” depending
upon whether each company engaged in the form of disclosure or not. For GRI we
specifically chose to review corporate websites and verify the actual reports rather than
relying on GRI’s list of reporting companies because the GRI list results from
corporations registering their report with GRI. We found the GRI list was incomplete.
The final sample yields reasonable variation on the independent variable of social
activity measured through disclosure actions. 31 U.S. companies have a CSR committee,
88 publish a CSR report, 48 publish a GRI report, and 13 subject disclosure to a
professional audit.
Dependent Variables – CSP for Stakeholders. CSP for stakeholders data are
taken from KLD Stat data compiled by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Research &
Analytics. Since 1991 KLD has produced annual CSR data on all of the S&P 500 firms,
plus another subset of companies; KLD now assesses the Russell 3000 as well, which is
included in 2001. Since 1991 KLD has produced annual CSP data on corporate practices
of large U.S. firms associated with multiple stakeholder groups (A full description of the
KLD system is available at www.kld.com).
Specifically, we are interested in six stakeholder-related performance arenas taken
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from the KLD database: (a) consumer (product); employee relations; human rights;
diversity (minority); environment; and community.
Each of these six KLD attributes summarizes corporate practices with respect to a
specific stakeholder. For each of these six attributes, KLD assesses a company’s strengths
and weaknesses. Based on assessments of each company, we construct a total strengths
count for each stakeholder attribute by summing a number of 0/1 “reason codes” which
contribute to that particular strength. Reason codes are binary 0/1 variables that
contribute to each of the KLD attributes.
Taking employee relations as an illustration, there are seven 0/1 reason codes that
contribute to the total employee relations strengths count: union relations, no-layoff
policy, cash profit sharing, employee involvement, retirement benefits, health and safety
programs, and other. For the employee relations attribute then, the strengths variable may
range from 0 to 7. Using another example, environment, there are five reason codes for
strengths such as environmentally beneficial products or services, pollution prevention,
recycling, clean energy, and other. Thus, for the environment stakeholder, the strength
index ranges from 0 to 5. (The KLD Research and Analytics website, www.kld.com, lists
the entire set of criteria used for each variable under the “Research” heading.)
The next step is to combine the reason codes of each stakeholder into a single
normalized dependent variable. Due to different number of reason codes for diverse
stakeholder, this net strength value is normalized by being divided by the range. For the
case of employee relations, net strength of each company is divided by 7. For the case of
environment, net strength ranges from 0 to 5, and it is normalized by being divided by 5.
Variables for the other four stakeholder groups are calculated in the same way.
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Control Variables. In order to screen out other effects influencing the
relationships between investment in CSR activity (CSI) and CSP for stakeholders, we
include proxies for each firm’s profitability, size, asset size, intangible resource and
industry categorization in statistical analysis models.
Scholars have argued that profits drive CSR activity, so-called the slack resource
theory (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) also argue that a firm’s
profitability indicates its competitiveness in the industry. Profitability is used as a proxy
for the market structure of a firm’s industry (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Thus, we
use each firm’s revenue in each year as a proxy for its profitability.
Researchers have argued that economies of scale and scope in delivering CSR
attributes will result in a positive correlation between a firm’s size and its CSP
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). In order to control this effect, we include two variables,
employee count and asset size as proxies for company size, following Waddock and
Graves (1997). We use the log transformation of both variables to adjust their skewed
distribution.
To account for intangible resources, we include the market price to book value
ratio or the MPBV ratio which would capture typical intangibles such as brand,
reputation and employee loyalty. MPBV also captures R&D intensity which has been
popularly used as a proxy for product differentiation. McWilliams and Siegel (2001)
propose that companies with a higher level of product differentiation will have more
opportunities to pursue CSP. Thus, we calculate the ratio of stock market price to book
value, using data from CRSP.
Industry classification for each firm is one of the most common control variables
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(Margolis & Walsh, 2003). We utilize the North American Industry Classification
System or NAICS as a variable, industry categorization of each firm. Compared to the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), another commonly used industry classification,
NAICS has superior availability and reliability (Bhoraj et. al., 2003; Weiner, 2005). We
created 18 industry dummy variables for the 19 industry classifications. All data for these
control variables except industry categorization which is based on NAICS codes are
taken from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the year of 2007.

Model
As proposed in previous sections, a main goal of this research is to examine and
determine whether there are any relationships between corporate social activities and
“CSP for stakeholders”. Thus, our empirical models treats investment in four corporate
social activities such as CSR board committee, CSR reporting, GRI report, and
Professional Audit as the independent variables, and “CSP for stakeholders” as the
dependent variable. Our model is as follows:
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CSPi , s = α + β (CSI i ,d ) + γ ( revenue i ) + τ (employee i ) + λ ( asset i ) + θ ( MPBV i ) + ∑ δ k (industry k ) + ε i

From this

k =1

formula, the dependent variable, CSPis, represents the CSP for a stakeholder s by ith
company. The coefficient β represents the effect of CSR activity d by ith company. The
coefficient γ represents the effect of revenue, and the coefficients, τ and λ represent the
effect of company size. The effect of market price to book value ratio is θ. The 18
coefficients, δk, each represent the effect of the kth industry, modeled by dummy
variables. εi is the usual OLS error term.

21

The primary interest in this research is in β, the coefficient of the CSR activity
variable, with all other variables included only as controls. We estimate various models
assigned with four CSI activity variables and seven CSP for stakeholder variables.

Data Analysis and Results
Data Analysis. Statistical analysis was done using the Ordinary Least Squared
regression analysis. We ran twelve regression variations with four CSR activity variables
associated with six “CSP for stakeholder” variables with same set of four control
variables and industry dummies for year 2007 and 2008. For empirical testing, we used
the regression algorithm (REG) in STATA.
STATA automatically checks for multicollinearity using the STAT algorith “VIF”.
The VIF results indicates "by how much other coefficients varainces are increased due to
the inclusion of each variable", and 1/VIF shows "each variable's variances independent
of other variables". In other words, if the VIF indicator is too large (> 10), and if 1/VIF is
too small (< 0.10), the variable is multicollinear. We have not reported these results for
all variables and models in our tables but note here the results for CSR and GRI reporting
in model 12 where both have significant impact on the dependent variable.
Multicollinearity might be a concern here because in practice many companies’ GRI
reports refer to data in their CSR reports using the technique of a “GRI index” to the CSR
report. The STATA “vif” report does not indicate any multicollinearity problem. GRI
report has "1.93" VIF and 52% independent variance and CSR report has "1.70" VIF and
59% of independent variance.
Results. Tables 1a and 1b present results from our statistical regression analyses.
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Table 1a presents regression results showing the impact of CSR activities on corporate
social performance for the same year, 2007, and Table 1b presents the results for the
impact of CSR activities on corporate social performance with a one-year time lag, 2008.
We present results from regression analyses in two tables for 2007 and 2008 in order to
explore the possibility that the impact of CSR activities on performance might involve a
time lag. Overall the correlation between social activities and performance is tighter with
the time lag.
Our first hypothesis is that for high appropriability stakeholder arenas, corporate
social activity will have a positive impact on corporate social performance. Our highest
appropriability stakeholder arena is the environment and we find that CSR reporting has a
positive impact on environmental performance in 2007 and both CSR and GRI reporting
have a positive impact in 2008. The impact for 2008 is significant at the highest level. In
intermediate appropriability stakeholder arenas, CSR committee had a significant
correlation with performance in the diversity arena in both 2007 and 2008 and in the
human rights arena in 2007. None of the activity measures had any impact on the
employee and consumer arenas where the firm opportunity for proactivity is low while
interest aggregation and articulation is high. We did not expect any of the social activity
measures to have an impact on community performance because we postulated that the
community arena offers few opportunities for appropriability due to dominant social
norms and inchoate interests. Contrary to expectations, one of our social activity
indicators, professional audit had a significant impact on community performance in
2008 and we discuss this finding more below.
Our second hypothesis was that we would expect, where appropriability was low,
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to find that learning-oriented corporate social activities would be more likely associated
with corporate social performance than would performance-oriented corporate social
activities. The results reported in Tables 1a and 1b show partial confirmation for this
hypothesis. CSR committee, a learning-oriented activity, is significantly associated with
corporate social performance in the diversity and human rights arenas in 2007 and with
corporate social performance in the diversity arena in 2008. These correlations were
significant and negative. Contrary to expectations, one of our two performance-oriented
social performance measures, GRI report, was correlated with diversity performance. We
postulated diversity as an intermediate appropriability arena because, while opportunity
for proactivity and voluntarism is moderately high, interest aggregation is moderately low.

Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here

DISCUSSION, FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS

The primary framing of research on strategic corporate social responsibility is on
the impact of either CSR or CSP on financial performance. This paper frames a different
question for practitioners and scholars concerned with strategic corporate social
responsibility: when, how and why is investment in corporate social responsibility
activity linked to corporate social performance as it is measured and reported on in the
business information world? The maturity of CSR practice and the evolution of research
on CSR pave the way for this type of “second-order” framing. CSR activity is here to
stay, whether or not its financial impact can be theorized or empirically proven.
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To explore the connection of corporate social responsibility activity and corporate
social performance we reconceptualize the concept of appropriability and use it to bridge
the stakeholder salience and strategic CSR value conditions literature. Stakeholder theory
is increasing in weight in the management literature (Laplume et. al., 2008) yet there is
little consensus about the best conceptualization of stakeholder salience for empirical
investigation and practical application. The paper shows how the concept of
appropriability can be a valuable bridge between instrumental stakeholder theory and the
smaller, but more concrete strand of research on strategic CSR value conditions. Our
analysis shows that corporate social responsibility activities are positively linked to
corporate social performance in arenas where appropriability is relatively high.
Our effort to marry conceptual work with empirical validation suggests the value
of pursuing both the appropiability concept and the distinction between performance and
learning-oriented corporate social activity. Our work is based on a unique dataset of
indicators of corporate social responsibility activity for large US firms, but data
limitations still render conclusions preliminary. Aside from controversy over the validity
of CSP data, another challenge is to empirically validate the appropriability
conceptualization proposed. While suggestive, our limited empirical investigation leaves
room for much further exploration. The viability of our conceptualization should be
explored through qualitative investigation of managers’ views. Our results on the impact
of reporting on social performance in the community social performance arena suggests
the complexity of assigning appropriability ‘values’ to different stakeholder issue arenas.
In addition, our categorization of appropriability opportunities in different stakeholder
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arenas is very US-centric and should not only be validated for the US context but could
be usefully explored in other national contexts.
We build on prior research that conceptualizes, and in some cases measures, CSR
activity. The difficulty of measuring CSR activity is a challenge in the quest to explore
the costs and benefits of attaining a particular CSP posture. We move beyond the most
commonly used measure of extent/level of social activity, which is charitable giving, and
draw a distinction between social activities oriented toward performance outputs and
those with a learning orientation. Just as we propose moving away from the focus on
financial consequences of CSR, the focus on a relatively short-term instrumental logic of
appropriability has its limits. Our discussion of performance and learning-oriented
corporate social activities builds on research that teases out the different business cases
for CSR (innovation cost-cutting, employee loyalty, etc.). Where tangibility is low, our
results offer evidence that relatively poor corporate social performance spurs learningoriented corporate responsibility activities. Again our empirical exercise suggests
possibilities for further exploring and fine-tuning the distinction between performance
and learning-oriented activities and their connection with corporate social performance.
One possibility is to explore the different impact of CSR and GRI reporting. Our analysis
found, for example, that GRI reporting had an impact on diversity while CSR reporting
did not. Our two-fold characterization of corporate social activity dovetails on existing
literature but leaves considerable scope for further research refining conceptual
understanding of variation in social activity and its measurement.
The main contribution of this paper is to explore the relationship between
investment in CSR activities and CSP for stakeholders using the framework of
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instrumental stakeholder theory and extending the concept of appropriability introduced
in the strategic CSR values literature. If these conceptual suggestions spur further
consideration and empirical research on the impact of CSR activities on CSP they should
build knowledge and contribute to the best practice of corporate responsibility.
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TABLE 1a
CSR Activities on CSP for Stakeholders a
(DV: 2007; n=88)
Dependent Variable
Stakeholder
(Stakeholder Category)
Control Variables
Revenue
Employee #
Ln (Asset)
Market Price to Book Value Ratio
Independent Variables
CSR Report
GRI Report
CSR Committee
Professional Audit
Model Fit
R2
(Adj. R2)
F (Prob>F)

Consumer
(I)
Model 1

Employee
(I)
Model 2

HumRight
(III)
Model 3

Diversity
(III)
Model 4

0.000 **
0.001
0.160
0.029

0.000
0.005 **
0.064
0.006

- 0.000
- 0.000
0.038
0.010

- 0.000
0.005 *
0.325
0.079

- 0.000
0.003 *
- 0.009
- 0.021
0.598 *
0.481
0.071
0.713

- 0.104
0.113
0.061
0.149

- 0.463
0.365
- 0.135
- 0.044

0.079
0.015
- 0.098 *
- 0.111

0.437
0.504
- 0.810 *
- 0.368

0.273
(0.042)
1.18 (0.297)

0.478
(0.312)
2.88 (0.001)

0.319
(0.103)
1.47 (0.119)

0.452
(0.277)
2.59 (0.002)

Env’t
(II)
Model 5

0.590
(0.459)
4.51 (0.000)

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
All regression coefficients for 13 industry dummies are not significant, so they are not presented in this table.

a
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Community
(IV)
Model 6
- 0.000 ***
0.004 *
0.716 ***
0.025
- 0.205
0.184
- 0.181
0.748
0.561
(0.422)
4.02 (0.000)

TABLE 1b
CSR Activities on CSP for Stakeholders a
(DV: 2008; n=84)
Dependent Variable
Stakeholder
(Stakeholder Category)
Control Variables
Revenue
Employee #
Ln (Asset)
Market Price to Book Value Ratio
Independent Variables
CSR Report
GRI Report
CSR Committee
Professional Audit
Model Fit
R2
(Adj. R2)
F (Prob>F)

Consumer
(I)
Model 7

Employee
(I)
Model 8

HumRight
(III)
Model 9

Diversity
(III)
Model 10

Env’t
(II)
Model 11

0.000 *
0.001
0.018
- 0.007 *

0.000
0.004 **
- 0.001
- 0.013

- 0.000
- 0.000
0.028
0.001

- 0.000
0.005 *
0.082
- 0.002

0.007
0.089
- 0.004
0.125

- 0.242
0.306
- 0.202
- 0.015

0.061
0.037
- 0.084
- 0.114

0.644
0.772 *
- 0.967 **
- 0.211

0.809 ***
0.475 *
0.013
0.432

0.359
(0.142)
1.65 (0.007)

0.457
(0.273)
2.49 (0.003)

0.318
(0.087)
1.38 (0.165)

0.470
(0.291)
2.62 (0.002)

0.665
(0.551)
5.85 (0.000)

- 0.000 **
0.002
0.063
- 0.003

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
All regression coefficients for 13 industry dummies are not significant, so they are not presented in this table.
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Community
(IV)
Model 12
- 0.000 **
0.004 *
0.365 *
- 0.000
- 0.222
0.442 *
- 0.332
0.710 *
0.546
(0.392)
3.54 (0.000)

